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The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned about the military's ability to deter
enemy action and counter enemy forces. In an effort to assess capabilities and have a
basis for apportioning necessary items, the Unified Commands were asked to identify
critical items. This paper looks at the various methods the Navy uses to determine
critical items with the objective of finding a consistent method for critical item
determination. Based on the results of research, the validity of existing programs used
in critical item identification could improve if there was more communication between
the Fleet Commander in Chief and his Type Commanders and Navy Supply Systems
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I. INTRODUCTION
Critical is a term that has connotations of something requiring immediate
response. The word "critical" is over-used. Because of its frequent use, everyone
thinks they understand what "critical" means. If asked to give a definition of "critical",
everyone's definition is slightly different. For clarity and consistency, one should
provide the desired definition when discussing "critical". Unfortunately, this is usually
not done and results are predictably diverse. When the word "critical" is used by the
military in reference to principal or secondary items, the confusion caused is the same
as in the civilian sector. This thesis deals with identification of critical items which are
loosely defined as items which, when not carried by the unit, affect the unit's capability
to perform its assigned mission.
Efforts to identify critical items in the Navy have primarily centered around
identifying which platforms and munitions are necessary to meet the threat and
determining how many of these platforms and munitions are needed. Traditional
efforts to determine which items on the platform were required involved looking at
which items were used in the past and using that information to determine which items
would be required in the future. The item with the highest demand was considered the
most important (critical) and no consideration was given to the impact the item had on
the unit's operational capability. Therefore, until recently, little effort had been put
into trying to determine which equipment on the platform must be functioning for the
platform to accomplish its mission. Recent efforts to determine critical items have
been directed toward new ship and aircraft construction programs. It is relatively easy
to theorize about a new ship or airplane that will accomplish a given mission. It is
much harder to put theory into practice by designing, developing and producing the
theorized craft with the needed capability and reliability. It is harder still to take an
existing ship or aircraft and determine which systems should be improved or changed
so the platform can accomplish the given mission.
The majority of the work done by the Navy with critical items has been in
improving readiness rather than trying to determine which items are in short supply or
have the greatest impact on availability. Efforts have been directed toward better
prediction of requirements to raise the probability of being ready to face any future
contingency.
This thesis will present the background on how the author became interested in
this topic and what is being done by the Navy today. It discusses methods used by
the Navy to determine requirements (planning) and how the operational side of the
Navy responds when planned requirements do not meet demands. Those times that
requirements do not meet demands have the potential of providing candidates for
"critical" items. The situation causing a demand for an item must be known before it
can be determined that the item is "critical". One of the major problems with critical
item identification is that "critical" is situation dependent. This thesis also presents:
1. Areas where planners need to do more work
2. Areas where the various echelons of command need to improve communication
3. Areas where planners and operators need to improve communication
Improvements in these three areas will facilitate critical item identification. Finally,
some topics in the area of critical item determination that need further study are
presented.
^he author first became aware of the problems involved in critical item
identification while assigned to the staff of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval
Forces Europe as a logistics planner.
II. BACKGROUND
Because of the Defense Department's shift of attention to the Joint Commander's
level of readiness, critical items, critical spares and essential sustainability are currently
of concern in Department of Defense circles. The primary concerns about these items
are:
1. How can we identify what is critical
2. How do we determine how stock much we need to meet the demand for the
critical item
3. How do we provide the critical items in the necessary quantities
4. Is there some mix of items that will give a higher level of effectiveness in terms
of criticality per dollar when funds are limited
Several attempts have been made to identify which items are critical. [Ref. 1: pgs. 2 -
4]. This is not a static set of identifiable items and it is hard to find a general
consensus among military planners of what is critical. Furthermore, any set of critical
items identified today may not be applicable to the world situation tomorrow.
In 1983 the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the Unified Commands and their
components to provide a list of critical items. This list was to be included in the
Logistics Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The items on this list would
be apportioned to the theater or service with the greatest need, by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in time of war. [Ref. 2] The items to be included were: (1) any item in short
supply or (2) anything that could be classified as a "war stopper". No clarification on
what constituted a "war stopper" was given. Each Unified Commander in Chief was
allowed to identify no more than 500 critical items and could allocate these to his
service components as he thought best. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces
Europe was allocated 120 Navy/Marine Corps critical items.
From the Navy's point of view this task was not well defined and was difficult to
do. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not provide a clear, concise description of what they
expected and the tasked the service component commands, through the Unified
Commanders in Chief to provide information that should come from the services.
The Fleet Commander in Chief does not have control over supply in the Navy.
That function belongs to the Navy Supply Systems Command which has overall
responsibility for determining requirements for material and procuring it for the entire
Navy. The Type Commanders for air, surface and subsurface also become involved in
this process because they provide input to the Navy Supply Systems Command,
through the Ships Parts Control Center and the Aviation Support Office, about which
parts have the highest demand. The Ships Parts Control Center and the Aviation
Support Office maintain usage data for the entire fleet, afloat and ashore.
Identification of critical items which are "items in short supply", the first definition of
critical given above, is not appropriate at the Fleet Commander in Chief level because
the Fleet Commander in Chief can only identify what is in short supply in his theater.
The term "short supply" refers to an item whose present stocks are less than the
predicted demand for the item. Being in short supply in one theater does not
necessarily mean an item is in short supply for the entire Navy. For example, it is
possible for an item, such as fuel, to be in short supply in a particular theater due to
lack of storage facilities in that theater but for worldwide stocks of fuel to be sufficient
for total Navy demand.
The other definition of critical given above, those items classified as "war
stoppers", if "war stopper" is defined as an item that keeps a platform/unit from
performing its mission, is already included in the Semi-Annual Situation Report.
[Ref. 3] No clarification was given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on whether the critical
items to be identified were to be in addition to those in the Situation Report."
Eventually the lists were prepared and submitted, along with a request for additional
clarification of the Joint Chiefs o^ Staff definition of critical. The critical items
identified by the Unified Commands included such items as ammunition, repair parts,
Advanced Base Functional Components, major end items, and were published in the
1984 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Logistics Annex.
The philosophy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on critical items has changed
somewhat since 1983. The Staff tends to understand the lack of response in providing
"lists" for the sake of providing lists, which was the only apparent purpose since no
incentives were given for the Unified Commanders in Chief or for their Components to
provide the lists. No additional funds to procure items identified as critical were made
2Within the Navy, a Semi-Annual Situation Report is made by every command,
to the command's reporting senior. This report is a review (often lengthy) of
achievements, on-going programs/projects, or problems encountered by the command.
The report covers the entire range of personnel, material conditions, material shortfalls,
support provided, support needed, mobilization capability, readiness, intelligence, and
other conditions that a command has encountered. The report also has a section for
the Commander in Chief or unit Commander to identify critical items.
available, and peacetime apportionment of critical items was not discussed. The
potential for wartime apportionment served as a disincentive for providing the lists
requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No service or Commander in Chief wants to
spend its budget dollars on items it thinks it will need in time of war only to have the
items taken away because another theater or service did not plan adequately. The
present Joint Chiefs of Staff policy is that critical items will be identified in the
Situation Reports. Once critical items are identified, the services must provide
information on consumption rates and current stockage levels by theater in accordance
with Reference 4 .
The critical item lists and the information from the Logistics Factors Report will
eventually be used by the Logistics Capabilities Estimator module of the Joint
Operational Planning and Execution System to provide a logistics capability assessment
of operations plans. The Logistic Capabilities Estimator will be usable by every
echelon of command that uses the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System to
develop operation plans, to evaluate the Command's portion of the operation plans.
The Logistics Capability Estimator will be an upgrade to the current Joint Operational
Planning System Movement Requirements Generator and will do everything the
Movement Requirements Generator does and more. The Movement Requirements
Generator is presently used to forecast gross tonnages of lift required to move
resupply. It can subdivide the requirements by class of supply, type of movement (air
or surface), origin, port of embarkation, port of debarkation, and date required. The
Logistics Capability Estimator uses the critical items and capabilities discussed above
to match capabilities to the requirements forecasted by the Movement Requirements
Generator and flag as shortfalls those requirements without corresponding capabilities.
These shortfalls will then be reviewed by planners who can either (1) make adjustments
to (a) requirements, (b) timing or (c) strategy as necessary to accomplish the mission or
(2) advise those concerned that the mission cannot be completed and identify the
critical items needed to complete the mission. [Ref. 5]
The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System is an iterative replacement
for the Joint Operational Planning System. The installation of the first phase is
scheduled to start in 19S9. The automated logistic estimate will not be available for
several years, but a manual analysis will be possible if the services submit the
information for the Logistics Factors Report. [Ref. 6]
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Discussions with personnel in Chief of Naval Operations (OP-401) and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, Programs, Analysis and Evaluation, Navy, regarding the
analysis of the critical item lists submitted, indicate that the methods of determining
critical items are as varied as the groups trying to determine what is critical. The first
decision to be made in this thesis is which definition of critical to use. This thesis will
combine the operational definition and the supply definition of critical resulting in
critical items being defined as items which are both: (1) in short supply and (2) capable
of causing the failure of the next highest component or system. Discussion will be
limited to secondary items which, in Navy- Supply Systems Command terminology, are
repairables, consumables, and repair parts. These items are being considered because
so much emphasis and study has been put into areas like munitions and weapons.
The Secretary of Defense is quoted in Reference 1 as saying ". . . If we do not
have adequate munitions to execute our plans to destroy enemy targets, there is little
point in possessing sustainability for other items ..." [Ref. 1: pg. 5]. What the
Secretary of Defense did not say was that if we do not have the operational platforms
and weapons systems from which to launch those munitions, there is little point in
having the munitions. A balance must be achieved. Having just operational
availability or sustainability, without the other, is of little benefit.
A problem exists in knowing which items are in short supply today that may be
needed in time of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want the Services and the Unified
Commanders in Chief to identify their wartime requirements and the existing
capabilities to meet those requirements. This thesis will discuss the methods the Nan-
uses to determine requirements, which is a major portion of the planning process. It
will look at the impact of the recent shift from a demand based method to an
availability based method for determining requirements for spare parts. Since planned
requirements do not always match actual operational demands and the times when
planning does not match demands are the times items potentially become critical,
options available when shortfalls occur will be discussed. Some topics, which have not
been discussed in the reports of current work in requirements determination, are
presented as areas which need further study for planning procedures to be complete.
Since critical items are both nebulous and temporal, expending a lot of effort to
define and identify what is critical is not the most productive use of time or money.
Our efforts would be better rewarded by trying to make our planning efforts more
closely relate to operations. The better our planning is, the less we will have to rely on
11




Imagine yourself as a naval power. You own a fleet of ships, with each ship in a
given state of readiness. You also have standard levels of readiness you would like
each ship to achieve. What can be done to bring those ships not at the specified level
of readiness up to standards? What can be done to maintain the ships at the specified
levels of readiness? These questions are being dealt with routinely in the U. S. Navy,
both from a planning viewpoint and from an operational/execution viewpoint. This
chapter will look at three programs in use to accomplish the above tasks from the
planning perspective of requirements determination (forecasting demand)/ For each
program, there will be a discussion of the theory used, how the program calculates
requirements and the program's general effectiveness. 4 The execution aspects of these
programs will be looked at in Chapter IV.
In 1982 the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations established
operational availability as the new measure of effectiveness for logistics support
[Refs. 7.8,9]. The prior measure of effectiveness the Navy used for logistic support was
percentage of demands satisfied. The method of determining requirements must be
changed to fit the new measure of effectiveness. Therefore some initiatives, sponsored
at the Chief of Naval Operations staff level, which address readiness improvement are
receiving attention by the Navy Supply Systems Command and Navy Contractors.
The two methods of determining requirements that will be discussed in this thesis are
the demand based method and the availability improvement method.
A. DEMAND BASED STOCKAGE COMPUTATIONS
Determining requirements deserves some comments at this point. Demands can
be classified as either deterministic or probabilistic. A deterministic demand has a
constant usage rate which is assumed to be known with certainty. A probabilistic
-Requirements determination will be used throughout this thesis when referring
to the planning process of forecasting demands. The phrase "requirements
determination" is used to avoid the inherent confusion involved in trying to keep
forecast demand and actual demand straight.
4None of the models or programs presented will determine criticality. Based on
the definition of critical used in this thesis, no item is inherently critical nor is any item
universally critical. Criticality is scenario dependent.
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demand has a usage rate that varies according to a probability distribution which is
assumed to be known and continuous. [Ref. 10: pgs. 78, 126]
Predicting spare parts for an item whose demand is deterministic does not present
much of a challenge. If the usage rate is known with certainty, providing adequate
spare parts is a straight forward process.
When demand is probabilistic, the use of a demand based model allows room for
error. Knowing the probability distribution of demand doesn't give the exact demand
at any given time. It only gives an estimate that is similar to the actual demand.
Predicting the number of spares required becomes harder because the demand
distribution must also be predicted. If the probability distribution of demand is known,
it is possible to determine a number of spares that will meet close to 100 percent of
demand for a given period of time. Figure 3.1 is the cumulative density function for a
Poisson demand with rate 10. From the figure it can be seen that nearly 100 percent of
demand (actually 99.84%) would be met if 20 items were stocked. This will give total
protection against downtime due to unavailability of spare parts. It will also cost a lot
in terms of capital invested in inventory and space for storage. The military is
generally not allowed the luxury of 100 percent protection. What is sought is a lower
level of protection for a decrease in capital expenditure and a decrease in the storage
space required. Finding the appropriate mix of items to accomplish this is extremely
difficult.
Requirements determination, using demand based methodology, uses the best
replacement factor for an item. The best replacement factor (usually referred to as
BRF) is a demand rate derived from reliability studies, contractor predicted usage or
Navy history of failure data from similar items. The best replacement factor is updated
annually by the Ships Parts Control Center using a weighted function based on the
demand for that item during the previous year and the existing best replacement factor
for that item. The equation for the best replacement factor recomputation is:
New BRF = a x (New Average Rate of Demand) (eqn 3.1)
+ (1 -a) x (Old BRF)
where a is the weighting factor assigned by Ships Parts Control Center. [Ref. 11: pg.
4-37] Those familiar with inventory theory or inventory modeling will recognize this
equation as an exponentially weighted moving average. The platform's overall annual
demand for an item is determined by multiplying the best replacement factor by the
number of installations of that item on the platform [Ref. 12: pg. 6].
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Figure 3.1 Probability of Demand.
Determining the number of spares needed is a straight-forward mathematical
calculation using the best replacement factor method. The a used by the Ships Parts
Control Center varies depending on the number of items in the population and on
whether the demand is increasing or decreasing. The new average demand rate is the
failure rate just observed and the old BRF is the exponentially weighted average of
previous demands. The results with this method are good for items which have been in
use by the Navy for three or more years and have a fairly constant demand rate.
Roughly 50 percent of the items used by the Navy can have spare parts determined by
the demand based methodology and achieve the Navy's goal of meeting at least 65
percent of demands [Ref. 13]. For items which have been in use for less than three
years or have a fluctuating demand rate, the demand based method does not provide
adequate protection against downtime due to unavailability of parts. Ships Parts
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Control Center has found that it takes roughly three years for a newly introduced item
to develop a demand history and for consumption rates to level out [Ref. 14].
The Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List is a demand based requirements list
of items, both consumable and repairable, which are to be carried on board a ship to
meet day to day operating requirements. This list is created when the ship is
commissioned and is originally based on manufacturer provided data on reliability and
maintenance. The Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List is recomputed each time the
ship goes through overhaul, using actual usage consumption data and is updated
whenever major equipment changes are made. Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists
are usually determined using the Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program
(FLSIP). The FLSIP methodology is as follows: any item installed on the ship which
can be replaced by ship's maintenance personnel is a candidate for the ship's
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List. Once candidate items are determined, a
predicted demand rate is generated using the item's best replacement factor and the
number of installations of the item on the ship. Using the Fleet Logistics Support
Improvement Program methodology, if the predicted demand rate is .25 per year or
greater, the item is allowed in the ships Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List. The
number of spares carried for each item in the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List is
dependent on the demand rate. One spare is carried for items which are classified as
"vital" (98° o of candidate items are classified as vital) and have a forecasted demand
between .25 per year and 4.0 per year. Items with demand of 4 or more per year carry
enough spares to provide a 90 percent protection against stockout, under the
assumption that demand has a Poisson distribution [Ref. 12: pg. 7].
This method proved unsatisfactory because the Navy's goal is to meet at least 65
percent of demands on-board the ship using the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance
List. Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists generated by the FLSIP method were
meeting only 49 percent of such demands [Ref. 12: pg. 1]. Planning was clearly not
supporting execution. A modified version of the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance
List generating program, known as the Modified Fleet Logistics Ship Improvement
Program (Mod-FLSIP), was developed. The Modified Fleet Logistics Support
Improvement Program methodology lowers the minimum demand rate for inclusion in
the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List to .1 per year if the item has an Item
Mission Essentiality Code of 3 or 4. (Item Mission Essentiality Codes will be
explained and discussed later in this chapter.) One spare is carried for items with a
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demand between .1 per year and 2.0 per year and two spares are carried for items with
demand between 2.0 per year and 4.0 per year. The spare parts stockage for items with
demand greater than 4.0 per year is the same stockage computed using the Fleet
Logistics Support Improvement Program method. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of
being out of stock at the end of one year, as a function of the yearly demand, if no
spares, one spare or two spares are available. For items with annual demand between
2 and 4. the probability of stockout is still high. The FLSIP and Mod-FLSIP policies
are based on annual demand. In actual operations, resupply occurs more frequently.
It makes more sense to look at probability of stockout during a resupply leadtime.
The average leadtime used by the Navy is 90 days. Figure 3.3 shows the probability of
stockout for the given leadtime demands. The larger yearly demands in Figure 3.2 were
converted to leadtime demands in Figure 3.3 and the respective probabilities computed.
Reference 15, discussing the impact of the Mod-FLSIP policy changes, states that
"Since implementation began in 1982, CASREP downtime for parts has been
decreasing." [Ref 15: pg. slide 5.1].
In 19S5 the Navy Fleet Material Support Office did a study to compare the
protection provided by the FLSIP and Mod-FLSIP stockage policies. For the study,
the Fleet Material Support Office ran a simulation using various ship types and
generated "demands" for parts. From this simulation it was found that the stockage
policy computed using the Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program methodology
would satisfy 53.5" percent of the total demands that were capable of causing Casualty
Reports, while the Modified Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program
methodology would satisfy 63 percent of such demands [Ref. 16: pgs. 9 - 10].
The Item Mission Essentiality Code was developed by the Navy Supply Systems
Command and is a method of combining an item's importance to its applicable end
item (Military* Essentiality) with its end item's importance to mission completion
(Mission Criticality). To determine the Item Mission Essentiality Code for an item,
both of the following questions must be considered. How will the failure of the item
affect the end item it supports? How will the failure of the end item affect successful
mission completion? The Modified Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program was
one of the earliest programs to recognize that basing stockage policies purely on
demand was insufficient to ensure a ship's operational capability. The ship's mission
"This differs fron the 49 percent referenced in the Bagby study because the
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Figure 3.2 Probability of Stockout Per Year.
must be considered and the item's impact on mission completion taken into account.
The Item Mission Essentiality Code was the way developed to do this.
An Item Mission Essentiality Code has been assigned to all items on the
Weapons System File at Aviation Support Office and Ships Parts Control Center. For
those items which the program managers have not done the necessary computations to
generate Item Mission Essentiality Codes, default codes have been assigned.
Consequently, some Item Mission Essentiality Code data is incorrect. Another
problem with Item Vlission Essentiality Codes is that an Item Mission Essentiality
Code ranks the items on a given platform, but has no corresponding ranking among
platforms. Items which are common to different classes of platform must necessarily
have a generic Item Mission Essentiality Code assigned, one which may underestimate
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Figure 3.3 Probability of Stockout Per Leadtime.
the item for the other platforms. Therefore. Item Mission Essentiality Codes will tell
what the most important items on a ship are but will not tell what the most important
items in the Task Organization or Fleet are. The upper echelon commanders should
have their own procedures for determining relative importance between units and
platform types. Since there are no analytical models available, Commanders at the
higher echelons of command must make a subjective determination if an airplane is
more important than a destroyer or an auxiliary ship is more important than an
aircraft carrier or submarine, etc.
Another deficiency in Item Mission Essentiality Codes is a direct result of a
deficiency in the FLSIP and Mod-FLSIP programs. This deficiency exists because
none of the models take into account the effect that the platform's mission can have
on failure rates. FLSIP and Mod-FLSIP used a fixed failure rate to determine
19
stockage policies. In actuality, the failure rate is not fixed. The failure rate varies from
mission to mission and is affected by the mission. The impact an item has on the
platform's capability to complete a mission is also dependent on the mission. It is
possible for an item to be critical for one mission, but not for other missions. Thus,
the demand and criticality for an item will change from mission to mission. These
problems are mentioned because they are deficiencies in the present systems.
Discussion of these problems will be limited to suggestions for further study contained
in Chapter V.
The demand based system which is presently in use clearly has some flaws. The
time necessary to determine valid demand rates is increasing as parts reliability
increases. The demand rate does not consider the impact the item has on the ship's
operational availability. These problems led to the development of programs that look
at the impact each part has on the operational availability of a unit.
B. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY BASED STOCKAGE COMPUTATIONS
In 19S4, as stated in Reference 9, the measure of effectiveness for the Navy
Supply System changed to operational availability from the old measure of percent of
demands satisfied. The most important characteristic of an item is no longer just
reliability but rather reliability and essentiality to the platform's mission completion
capability. The determination of what is critical is no longer by number of demands in
a given time period but rather by the amount of operational availability improvement
provided by carrying that item as a spare.
Operational availability is determined by:
MTBF.
An = (eqn 3.2)MTBF + MTTR + MLDT
where:
1. MTBF is Mean Time Between Failure (reliability)
2. MTTR is Mean Time To Repair (maintainability)
3. MLDT is Mean Logistic Delay Time (supportability)
[Ref. 17: pg. 1]. MTBF is the time the system is up and the sum of MTTR and MDLT
is the time the system is down.
Mean Logistic Delay Time is similar to Mean Supply Response Time. Mean
Supply Response Time generally refers to the average waiting time for spare parts.
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The Mean Logistic Delay Time used by Hall, et al. includes nine other "logistic
elements", which are not elaborated upon, in addition to the average waiting time for
spare parts [Ref. 17: pg. 1]. If observing operations on a ship, two times will be
observed. One time will be the time necessary to get the needed part from the ship's
storeroom. The other time will be the time necessary to get the needed part from an
external source. Obviously, these times will vary from part to part, but in general an
average time for parts held in inventory and an average time for parts not carried in
inventory can be determined. The Mean Supply Response Time represents the average
length of time required to satisfy a demand. The actual computation of Mean Supply
Response Time also includes the probability of item failure. The equation used by
"Navy Supply Systems Command for computation of Mean Supply Response Time is:
D = Lllx>s (x- S)p(x) (eqn3.3)
where:
1. D = Mean Supply Response Time
2. X = expected number of demands per time unit
3. S = number of items in stock.
4. p(x) = probability of requiring x units
[Ref. 11: pg. 4-J-3].
Using an availability model to determine requirements is more complex than
using the demand based FLSIP method. More input information must be known and
often it is difficult to obtain the necessary data. The mean time between failure is a
measure of an item's reliability. The mean time to repair is treated as a constant, but
is actually influenced by the training required by the personnel doing the repairs, the
number of repair facilities and the queueing discipline used at the repair facilities. The
mean logistic delay time takes into consideration the availability of trained personnel as
well as the availability of spares, the time necessary to get a spare, the probability a
spare will be needed, and the expected number of spares needed which are included in
the mean supply response time. Of the three times described above, mean logistic
delay time is the hardest to determine. It has the most variables, some of which are
not always the result of objective mathematical computations.
From Equations 3.2 and 3.3 it is apparent that, theoretically at least, the
availability improvement provided by any item will not be constant with regard to the
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number of spares that are carried for an item. Adding one spare of a component may
increase availability by ten percent, but two spares will not usually give a twenty
percent improvement in availability. The improvement gained depends on the
probability of having X failures in a given time, the number of spares in inventory and
the time necessary to get another spare through procurement or repair. So the current
models go through each item on the platform, adding spares one at a time until the
specified availability level is reached.
Two programs developed to determine requirements based on operational
availability are the Readiness Improvement Program and the Readiness Based Spares
program. Both programs have availability improvement as their measure of
effectiveness and both are designed to work within a budget constraint. Many factors
affect readiness. These factors can be separated into three basic categories: reliability,
maintainability, and supportability. Readiness Based Spares primarily addresses the
supportability factors while the Readiness Improvement Program addresses all factors.
I. Readiness Improvement Program
The Readiness Improvement Program looks at a platform's current level of
readiness. If the platform is not at a specified level of readiness, the program tries to
determine how readiness can be improved. Some methods for improvement include
redesign or design modification of some of the platform's components, modification of
maintenance procedures and/ or schedules, a different mix of spares or different
numbers of spares. This program can be used on new construction using design
estimates for reliability or on existing platforms using historical data on downtime and
failures.
The two models used by the Readiness Improvement Program are TIGER and
the Availability Centered Inventory Model. The Readiness Improvement Program first
uses TIGER to determine which items should be considered critical. The Availability
Centered Inventory Model is then used to determine the spare parts necessary7 to
achieve specified levels of availability. TIGER is then run again using the spares
generated by the Availability Centered Inventory Model to see if the critical items from
the first run are still critical or if the spares recommended by the Availability Centered
Inventory Model are sufficient to meet predicted demand.
a. TIGER
TIGER is a simulation model developed by Navy Sea Systems Command.
A flow diagram of inputs and outputs is given in Figure 3.4 [Ref. 18: pg. 2-3]. Input
data includes mean time between failures, mean time to repair, duty cycle, allowable
downtime, mission timeline, reliability data, maintenance policy, and number of spares
at each level of maintenance. Output data includes system reliability, system
availability, readiness and critical equipment. Critical equipment output is specified in
two categories:
1. Critical equipment due to unavailability
2. Critical equipment due to unreliability
Tiger uses item availability and reliability to determine which item is responsible for
system failure. The items responsible for system failure or downtime are classified as
critical. [Ref IS: pg. 9-13]. The model can be used on the entire range of equipment
from single components through complex systems. The model uses simulation rather
than analytical techniques due to the complexity of computations for intricate systems.
[Ref. IS: pg. 1-1].
The objective of the TIGER model is to predict how well a system
performs in the areas of reliability, maintainability, and availability [Ref. 18: pg. 2-1].
Since TIGER is a simulation model, it operates differently from the computational
models to be discussed later in this chapter. The way TIGER works is for the user to
specify the details of the mission the platform is to perform, the equipment on-board
the platform (including the mean time before failure, mean time to repair, and duty
cycle), the operational rules (which equipment must be operational for the platform to
be operational, which components of a piece of equipment must be operational for the
equipment to be operational), and logistic information (which spare parts are carried
on-board or at a depot-level maintenance facility, resupply times). When all the
necessary parameters are provided, TIGER simulates the specified operation and
produces the appropriate reports. It is necessary to remember that multiple repetitions
of a program must be run and that program results are in terms of means and standard
deviations resulting from the multiple simulations. The TIGER documentation advises
users on the number of times a simulation should be run to obtain a specified level of
statistical confidence. [Ref. IS: pgs. 2-2 - 2-7]
b. Availability Centered Inventory Model
The Availability Centered Inventory Model was developed by Consolidated
Analysis Centers, Incorporated for the Naval Sea Systems Command. The Availability
Centered Inventory Model is a computer program which uses design-stage
characteristics of reliability, maintainability, and supportability to determine stock
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Figure 3.4 TIGER Computer Program Flow.
levels at all stockage facilities for a particular platform in order to maximize the
platform's operational availability subject to a given budget constraint. An alternative
use of the program is to minimize inventory costs subject to a specified availability
constraint. [Ref. 19: pg. 12]
The Availability Centered Inventory Model assumes that a system is
subject to failures only the amount of time prescribed by its availability. This means
that if a piece of radar equipment is scheduled to operate 50 hours a week and has an
availability of 85 percent, spare parts will be based on a work week of 42.5 hours
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because that is all the time the equipment can be expected to be operational based on
its availability level. The Availability Centered Inventory Model also assumes that
system unavailability is due to failure of only one component, i.e. no multiple failures
can occur. There are no failures when the system is unavailable, either. Thus, when a
failed component is replaced, the system is again available. If a component is common
to two or more systems on a platform, the Availability Centered Inventory Model
treats each component as a different item, i.e. it does not consider commonality of
parts. The Availability Centered Inventory Model assumes that availability is the
probability that all components considered are available. [Ref. 20: pgs 2-10 - 2-11]
The Availability Centered Inventory Model is the only "sparing to
availability" model currently approved for use on U. S. shipboard systems [Ref. 17: p.
1]. What sparing to availability does is look at all components of a system and the
impact each one has on the overall availability of the platform. The model goes
through each component of the platform and determines the availability improvement
provided by stocking another spare for that component. The spare which provides the
greatest improvement to platform availability is the next spare added to the shipboard
stockage list.
An added feature of this model is that it is designed to work within a
budget constraint, so if a specified amount of money is available, the model will tell
you which spares to buy to get the best availability improvement for that budget
amount. The program is designed to compute stockage policies for all components of
a platform at all levels of support, i.e. for shipboard systems, the model computes the
number of spares carried on board, the number of spares to be stocked at the
intermediate maintenance activity and the number of spares to be stocked at the depot
level maintenance activity. To assist in analyzing shipboard spares, the model
computes two sets of output, one based on the Availability Centered Inventory Model
parameters and one based on a current sparing policy (Fleet Logistics Support
Improvement Program, Modified Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program, or
Maintenance Criticality Oriented Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List). The model
gives the planner lists of spares generated by the Availability Centered Inventory
Model and by the current sparing policy so he can compare stock levels and inventory
performance from both models without having to rerun the program and possibly
introduce errors when changing parameters. [Ref. 17: pg. 2]
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The Availability Centered Inventor}' Model is used in new procurement
programs by the contractors to determine initial spares purchases. Initial Coordinated
Shipboard Allowance Lists are prepared by the Ships Parts Control Center using
FLSIP and Mod-FLSIP as usual. These initial Coordinated Shipboard Allowance
Lists are then updated with the contractor's stockage list. The results have been
encouraging with improved availability for the same cost or the same level of
availability for a reduced cost. Unfortunately, the time and cost necessary for
recomputing stockage policies for existing shipboard systems have resulted in the Chief
of Naval Operation's staff limiting use of the Readiness Improvement Program to new
construction or selected existing programs.
So far the Readiness Improvement Program has only been used on the DD
963 and the FFG 7 classes of ships with a mixture of different spares and design
modifications being used to improve readiness [Ref. 21: pgs. 49-9, 49-15]. For the DD
963 class, hardware modifications to improve reliability were predicted to improve
availability by eleven percent at a cost of S5.371 million per ship [Ref. 21: pg. 49-22].
For the FFG 7 Class, it was found that the MK-92 Fire Control System caused 28
percent of the downtime. The failure rate of the MK-92 was higher than predicted,
resulting in on-board spares unavailability. The short term solution was to increase the
number of spares on-board at a cost of S245,000 per ship. The long term solution was
to modify the hardware to improve reliability at a cost of S18 million per ship. Total
ship availability was expected to increase by twelve percent by June 1987 and the
number of spares needed in the future is expected to decline. [Ref. 21: pg. 49-10]
2. Readiness Based Spares
The Readiness Based Spares program looks only at the readiness improvement
achievable through a different mix of spares, "which is just one of the options used by
the Readiness Improvement Program. Readiness Based Spares addresses location of
spares (are spares aboard ship or not) and availability of spares (how much is in stock).
To run the Readiness Based Spares models, the component; subcomponent
interrelationships must be included in the input parameters. Types of information
required are:
1. Are the components in series or parallel
2. Which subcomponents make up each of the components
3. Are the subcomponents in series or parallel
4. What is the reliability of each subcomponents
5. Will the component or the subcomponent be replaced "upon failure
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6. What is the essentiality of each item, by application
The Readiness Based Spares program is used to maximize availability within a cost
constraint or to minimize a cost within an availability constraint. [Ref. 15: pgs. slide
6.1. slide 12.1]
The Readiness Based Spares program uses the Availability Centered Inventory
Model for shipboard spares determination and the Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model for
aviation spares determination. Because of the similarities of the Readiness Based
Spares Program to the Readiness Improvement Program, to the point of using some of
the same models, the Readiness Based Spares program can be considered a subset of
the Readiness Improvement Program.
a. Multi-Item Multi-Echelon Model
The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model is similar to the Availability Centered
Inventory Model in methodology and output. The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model
objective function is to minimize inventory costs subject to a given availability
requirement. The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model has alternative of maximizing
availability subject to an inventory cost constraint. [Ref. 19: pg. 12 ] The assumptions
used in the optimization are slightly different from the assumptions made by the
Availability Centered Inventory Model. The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model assumes
that the failure rate does not depend on the tempo of operations. The Multi-Item
Multi-Echelon model also allows the system to have multiple, simultaneous component
failures and for failures to occur when the system is unavailable. The Multi-Item
Multi-Echelon model also does not consider commonality of parts between end items.
The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model assumes that availability is the probability that
all parts are available at an arbitrary point in time. [Ref. 20: pgs. 2-10 - 2-11]
The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model was developed by the Center for
Naval Analyses at about the same time as the Availability Centered Inventory Model.
The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model was designed to work specifically with multiple
indentured inventor}" systems. Since the two models were developed by different
organizations, to accomplish different functions, it is not unusual that they are based
on different assumptions. Under the Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model, the number of
days which an individual component is subject to failures is determined by the
component's operational availability. This means that different components may be
subject to failures for differing lengths of time. In essence, components can fail when
the overall svstem is down. The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model allows the svstem to
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still be down once the failed part is replaced, i.e. multiple failures or failures when the
system is down. The Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model and the Availability Centered
Inventory Model therefore generate the same type of information but the number of
spares stocked for a particular component may not be identical for the two models
because of these differences in assumptions. [Ref. 20: pgs. 2-10 - 2-11]
b. ARROWS Model
Another readiness based model is the Aviation Readiness Requirements
Oriented to Weapon Replaceable Assemblies (ARROWS). ARROWs is mentioned
because it was developed about the same time the Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model
and does essentially the same things. ARROWS makes the same assumptions about
availability rates and multiple failures as does the Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model.
ARROWS was developed by the Fleet Material Support Office for the Aviation
Support Office to use in determining aviation spares at the consumer level (carried on-
board ships with aircraft embarked) for high cost, mission-essential items which can be
removed at the organizational level. ARROWS can be used for a single aircraft or an
entire deckload of aircraft to determine the optimum stockage policy for a specified
availability. It handles multiple aircraft on a sequential basis and takes into account
commonality of parts. This differs from the Availability Centered Inventory Model
and the Multi-Item Multi-Echelon model in which duplicate items are spared as
separate or individual items. Model availability results can be based strictly on high
cost, mission-essential items, or all items. The Fleet Material Support Office has
recommended that ARROWS be designated as the Readiness Based Spares model for
aircraft because it was designed to do readiness based sparing and it was designed to
run on the Aviation Support Office computer system and interface with the necessary
Aviation Support Office files. [Ref. 22: pg. 23]
c. Readiness Based Spares Test
The Readiness Based Spare program was tested during the 1986 USS
Enterprise deployment. The purpose of the Readiness Based Spares Test was to
determine the feasibility of using Readiness Based Spares models to build full air-wing
Aviation Consolidated Allowance Lists and to estimate the improvement in aircraft
performance resulting from use of the Readiness Based Spares models. [Ref. 23: pg. 1]
The test was conducted using the Readiness Based Spares Aviation Consolidated
Allowance List for the F-14s embarked on the USS Enterprise during the 1986
deployment. The cost of the readiness based AVCAL was constrained to be the same
as the traditional demand based AVCAL.
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Since the Enterprise is an aircraft carrier, it has both an Aviation
Consolidated Allowance List and a Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List. Aviation
Consolidated Allowance Lists are computed for all ships with aircraft assigned. An
Aviation Consolidated Allowance List is similar to a Coordinated Shipboard Allowance
List in that it is a list of items necessary to support the embarked aircraft and it must
provide a specified level of coverage. The demands used in the Aviation Consolidated
Allowance List production are based on 90 days instead of the annual demands seen in
the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List, because Aviation Consolidated Allowance
Lists are recomputed prior to each deployment. This is necessary because the mix of
aircraft generally changes with each deployment and the Aviation Consolidated
Allowance List is designed to support the embarked aircraft.
For the 1986 test, the Enterprise Aviation Consolidated Allowance List was
computed twice, once using the traditional Aviation Consolidated Allowance List
generation method and once using the Readiness Based Spares method. The data base
used to produce the Aviation Consolidated Allowance Lists was based on 3-M data
from the 1984 Enterprise deployment and included only items which had one or more
failures during the deployment. Therefore the data base was not as extensive as that
used for normal Aviation Consolidated Allowance List provisioning. [Ref. 23: pg. 2]
Consumable items are most noticeably missing. As expected, the models produced
different sets of spares within the same budget amount. The traditional Aviation
Consolidated Allowance List for F-14s is 30 percent consumable items. The Readiness
Based Spares model did not specify spares be stocked at the depot level but the
simulation program assumed peacetime resupply rates for these items, thus using items
that the Readiness Based Spares model didn't stock. There were more than 400 items
which experienced a single failure on the 1984 cruise. The Readiness Based Spares
model treated these items as if they were always in the Aviation Consolidated
Allowance List and generated higher levels of spares for these items than would
normally occur. Generally, one demand for an item is insufficient to guarantee its
inclusion in the Aviation Consolidated Allowance List.
The Center for Naval Analyses, which conducted the test, attempted to
predict mission capable rates and fully mission capable rates based on the spares
forecast and then compare the mission capable/ fully mission capable rates to the 1984
Enterprise deployment mission capable/ fully mission capable rates. In presenting
results of the test to OP-91, the Center for Naval Analyses added the caveat that the
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results cannot be considered conclusive because the aircraft mix for the 19S4
deployment was not the same as for the 1986 deployment and weather conditions were
not the same either (1986 encountered a typhoon). Since the aircraft mix was different,
the data base from 1984 was not a good basis for the 1986 Aviation Consolidated
Allowance List.
Mr. P. Evanovich, of the Center for Naval Analyses, states in Reference 23
that a 2.1 percent to 12.2 percent increase over the 1984 mission capable rates and a
1.1 percent to 6.8 percent increase over the 1984 number of sorties flown were
experienced during the test. He feels that the improvements shown are understated
because of limitations in the data base and in the Center for Naval Analyses model
used to simulate and analyze the deployment. [Ref. 23: pg. 16]
C. COMPARISON
Figure 3.5 [Ref. 15: pg. slide 13.1] is a conceptual representation relating item
reliability and system complexity to stockage policies. Complexity refers to the
technology involved in the development of the part. A pump is an example of a low
complexity system while a radar is an example of a high complexity system. No matter
what level of reliability a part has, it can have sufficient spares to meet demand
determined by traditional demand based models if the part is used in a medium to low
complexity system. Readiness Based Spares chooses spare parts based on availability
improvement per dollar spent. Highly reliable parts used in highly complex systems
have the best results when spares are determined using the methodology of the
Readiness Based Spares program. The Readiness Improvement Program will determine
if a different mix of spare parts will improve availability or if redesign/ system
modification is necessary. Parts with low reliability used in highly complex systems
achieve the best results when spares are determined by the Readiness Improvement
Program. The Readiness Improvement Program works best on these parts because
more or different spares have little impact on availability improvement, so the program
then looks for alternate methods of availability improvement. Design modifications or
redundancy need to be included and the Readiness Improvement Program will identify
which parts need to be modified.
The programs discussed above are examples of our capability to determine
requirements. The Navy has just started looking at the effects the mission and tempo
of operations have on demand. The Navy has realized that the items with the highest
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Figure 3.5 Sparing Model Selection Criteria.
It has been realized that for execution/operations to go smoothly, planning must be
done accurately. The more accurately that planning is done, the fewer the number of
critical items in existance. The Navy is improving its predictive capabilities but still
falls short at times. The next chapter discusses some of the measures taken when
planned requirements are insufficient to meet demand. Actions taken by various
echelons of command to counter the negative effects of not having a needed item in
stock are also presented.
32
IV. WHEN REQUIREMENTS DO NOT MEET DEMANDS
In Chapter III the planning methods used by the Navy to predict demand were
discussed. It is impossible to plan for every situation that can occur. The recent shift
within the Navy to operational availability is an attempt to be better prepared for the
situations most damaging to a platforms operational status. What needs to be
discussed now are the Navy's methods for handling situations in which the planned
requirements do not satisfy demand.
At the unit level, there is little flexibility. Storage space on board ship is limited,
requiring only essential spares be carried on board. This necessitates a thorough
understanding of the ship and the problems most likely to arise, the impact each may
have on operational availability and the number of spares required to correct the
problem. The Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List establishes the types and
quantities of each item to be carried on board the ship. Deviations from these set
standards are frowned upon but do occur. Experienced supply officers or department
heads will stock unauthorized spares if they know a certain component tends to fail
more often than the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List authorized stockage level
would indicate. Otherwise, the only recourse in the event of the failure of a critical
item is to submit a Casualty Report and a requisition and wait for the needed part to
arrive.
There are procedures established, called Allowance Change Requests, where a
ship unit can request that its Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List be changed. Such
a request may be made for the following reasons:
1. The failure rates of an item are greater than or less than estimated
2. The unit is in a new operating area or operating under conditions that require
different support
3. A change in mission assignments has been made which requires additional
equipment or repair parts
4. Technical improvements in equipment; systems and repair parts have been made
which can provide additional capability
The Supply Officer is expected to check the Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists on
his supporting tender to ensure that the desired changes have not already been made
and simply have not reached him yet. [Ref. 24] The allowance Change Request process
33
is not a rapid action. A lot of time is involved in filling out forms, providing
justification for the change and obtaining authorization for submitting the Allowance
Change Request. The Allowance Change Request goes from the unit to the unit's
Type Commander (for information) and to the Ships Parts Control Center. The Ships
Parts Control Center takes appropriate action and notifies the unit. If the change has
been approved, the unit can requisition the desired part.
There is hope that the recent implementation of the Shipboard Non-Tactical
Automatic Data Processing Program II (SNAP II) on smaller ships will reduce the
amount of paperwork and the time necessary to process Allowance Change Requests.
Since implementation of SNAP II on smaller ships, the correlation has increased
between the equipment actually on the ship and the equipment the Ships Parts Control
Center thinks is on the ship. With SNAP II, it is a quicker, easier process to notify
Ships Parts Control Center of parts/equipment changes and the automated system
rejects requisitions for items not in the allowable parts/equipments data base of SNAP
II. It is hoped that Ships Parts Control Center will start comparing requisitions
actually submitted to planning data and start making adjustments to Coordinated
Shipboard Allowance Lists without waiting for the unit to realize planning data doesn't
match operational demand and request a change. The Ships Parts Control Center
cannot provide a definitive answer on when this will occur until resystemization is
complete in the late 1989 timeframe.
At the unit level, not much thought is given to critical item determination or
non-critical item determination. Day to day operations do not leave much time for
speculating about future requirements. Naval operations and the supply system are
theoretically structured so this is not necessary. Based on the type of operation, the
shipboard Supply Officer has guidelines and procedures that tell him how much of
which items to order at what time to keep the ship running. Since things do not
always work as designed, other precautions are taken and the Fleet Type Commanders
and the Navy Supply System organizations monitor daily operations to ensure minor
problems do not become major.
The Fleet Type Commanders monitor all platforms under their command. The
Type Commanders are responsible for keeping their platforms at their highest level of
readiness. Therefore the Type Commanders closely monitor Casualty Reports for ships
Resystemization is the term used when discussing installation if new computer
hardware at Ships Parts Control Center and the Fleet Material Support Office and the
conversion of the existing software to be compatible with the new hardware.
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and Not Mission Capable Partial Mission Capable reports for aircraft and keep track
of systems and parts causing failures. The Type Commanders work with the Ships
Parts Control Center and the Aviation Support Office to have the deficiencies
corrected. The Type Commanders provide information on system failures to Ships
Parts Control Center and the Aviation Control Office. They also provide repair or
procurement priorities for the various items and recommendations on whether the
corrective measure should include redesign or modification of the item or if more
spares will soive the problem. The deficiencies can be either in the item/system not
meeting design reliability standards, the planned level of stocks being insufficient to
meet demand or the design reliability standard being inadequate. Type Commanders
have been known to keep their own stocks of certain troublesome items in order to
expedite replacement parts to ships when Casualty Reports occur.
Fleet Commanders and Fleet Commanders in Chief are also interested in
Casualty Reports. The Fleet Commanders each have specific missions which they
must accomplish. These missions may require all of their assigned forces or just a part
of them. In either case the Commander must know the status of all his units in order
to make decisions rapidly. These Commanders, too, have been known to have their
own stocks of items to expedite repairs in units within their area of responsibility.
Having a second level of support improves the probability of having certain required
parts. It must be remembered that the Type Commanders and Fleet Commanders are
subject to the same problems with predicting requirements that are faced by the Navy
Supply System. Fleet Commanders in Chief, while not maintaining their own stocks of
items, are interested in expediting Casualty Reported related repairs. Frequently, the
Fleet Commander in Chief will increase shipping priorities to reduce transit time of a
Casualty Reported spare.
The Fleet Type Commanders, Fleet Commanders, and Fleet Commanders in
Chief, all of whom have planning staffs, are monitoring the day to day material
condition of units in their command. In 19S3, the planning staffs for the Fleet Type
Commanders were asked by the Fleet Commander in Chief to provide input for the
"Critical Items" lists and did so. Unfortunately, the volume of data provided by the
Type Commanders was so great that is caused a problem for the Commanders in
Chiefs' staffs to integrate the data based on their interpretation of the threat and
understanding of the impact specific repair parts have on the mission completion
capability of specific platforms.
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In order to accurately determine which items are critical, the threat must be
explicitly understood so the decision maker will know which mix of forces (air, surface,
and subsurface) are necessary to effectively counter the threat. Once the forces are
defined, determinations can be made as to which parts have the greatest impact on
availability and are in short supply.
Planning stalls are responsible for planning the operations carried out by the
units. The logistic support required by a unit is not tailored to the operation but
rather of a generic nature designed to fit any situation any time. The various echelons
of command have not yet found it necessary to devote much planning to the logistic
support required by an operation. In order to improve logistic support for specific
operations, one thing that could be done by the planning staffs is to determine the
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List for a specific deployment. Using the
availability improvement methodology, they could augment the regular (generic)
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List, as appropriate, to reflect changes related to the
deployment specific requirements. Another option would be to consider the entire
Battle Group as a unit and generate a scenario specific Coordinated Shipboard
Allowance List for the Battle Group. The generated requirements would then need to
be compared with the individual Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists of each ship
in the Battle Group and either have the items not carried prepositioned or added to the
Coordinated Shipboard Allowance Lists of any of the units in the Battle Group that
have available space. This option could also provide stockage levels for items not
carried by the smaller units in the Battle Group because of space limitations, thus
improving supply support for the smaller units. Items with insufficient demand to be
carried on individual units may be included in an aggregate Coordinated Shipboard
Allowance List, thus reducing the probability of downtime due to unavailability of
parts. The last two changes would require the Battle Group to work together
logistically as well as operationally. This is often done by individual supply officers as
a matter of survival, but not as a matter of Navy policy. Navy policy emphasizes unit
integrity and self-sufficiency.
A Casualty Report signals a failure of the planning system. The Navy Supply
Systems Command, through its subordinate Supply Centers and Supply Depots
worldwide, can only react once Casualty Report requisitions occur. If the needed part
is not held at the center/depot receiving the requisition, other depots in the area are
checked. If the part is still unavailable, the requisition is forwarded to the next Supply
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Center. Much work is in progress to automate supply centers and depots so they can
more rapidly locate items. Work is also being done to network the supply center and
supply depot computers worldwide so it will be possible from any supply location
around the world to locate a needed item. [Ref. 25]
This chapter is not meant to imply that the Navy Supply System has failed to do
its job. The objective the Navy Supply System is trying to accomplish in determining
requirements is very broad and general. The supply system planners must define
requirements for all platforms to meet all contingencies in all parts of the world. When
the mission statement is that broad and general, the spare parts determined by the
models tend to be the ones most likely to fail in any given situation. For planning to
more closely match day to day operations, a generic solution cannot be used. What is
being presented in this chapter are alternate methods used in peacetime to speed up
procedures when planning does not match demand. The time delays inherent in
normal resupply operations can be too long for situations when items become
"critical". Consequently, different levels of command maintain their own stockpiles of
certain items in order to get a part where it is needed within a specified amount of
time. What is needed is more effort to ensure that planning scenarios match the likely
world situations the Navy will be involved in or needs to be prepared for.
What this chapter has examined are the existing methods the operational Navy
uses when the predictions made by the planning Navy turn out to be wrong. One of
the biggest problems faced by the Navy, both in planning and in operations, is that
"official" doctrine lags "operational" doctrine. What we do, as defined by publications
and instructions, is not necessarily what we will do in the "heat of the battle". There
will always be some differences, but the sooner we accept that some things listed as
Navy policy just will not be done in a crisis, the easier the job will be for the planners.
Planners are restricted to work within the confines of "official doctrine", even if it is
known that "official doctrine" would be inappropriate in a given situation. When
planners are allowed to plan for specific situations, in a realistic manner, planning will




In looking at the Navy planning systems and models and the operation of the
Navy Supply System, it became apparent that deficiencies exist but the deficiencies are
not the cause o[ the difficulty involved in providing the Joint Chiefs of Staff a list of
critical items. The first problem to be solved was the determination of the appropriate
definition of "critical item". The next problem was how to select items, which fit the
definition of critical, from the many items that are needed on a daily basis. At this
point it was realized that "critical" has a relationship to the situation in which an item
is needed. Consequently, there is no universal list of critical items that can be provided
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
What would be feasible to provide to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a list of items
that would be candidates for critical items under specified scenarios. Unfortunately,
the Navy cannot do this because their planning systems do not allow scenario specific
planning on a routine basis. It is a workable problem, and one that is probably not
too difficult. The existing programs could be used, but new consumption factors for
specific areas would need to be developed to replace the general consumption factors
presently in use.
B. FURTHER STUDY
An area that needs future study is wartime demand. Demand rates in wartime
are likely to be higher because of higher operating levels, but how much higher and will
the increase be the same for all items? Forecasting of wartime demand has not
appeared in any of the discussions of the Readiness Based Spares Program or the
Readiness Improvement Program in this paper or in any of the references. This thesis
has addressed requirements determination, but only from the viewpoint of peacetime
consumption. Peacetime consumption rates are not too difficult to determine
compared to wartime rates. Previous consumption rates used by the Joint Operational
Planning System were supposed to be based on peacetime consumption with a wartime
factor based on information on consumption during World War II, the Korean conflict
and the Viet Nam police action. The latest planning figures are based on a study
sponsored by the Chief of Naval Operations (OP - 40) which looked at consumption
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for all deploying ship for a two year period. From this data, the current consumption
rates of pounds per man per day of each class of supply for each ship type were
determined. The study also looked at ships involved in high intensity deployments and
computed consumption factors for them. The study found that there was not a
significant difference between the lift assets necessary to support the two intensities.
Information on significant differences in consumption levels was not given but could
not be great because it was stated that peacetime consumption rates had to be doubled
to require an additional Mobile Logistics Support Force Ship. [Ref. 26] Operation
plans used to multiply peacetime consumption rates by a set factor to arrive at
estimated wartime consumption rates. There are no longer different consumption rates
for wartime and peacetime. The affect of the availability improvement methodology
under wartime conditions has not yet been tested. It has already been stated that just
because one spare is good it does not follow that two spares are better. The effect
wartime tempo has on consumption of items whose spares are determined by the
Readiness Based Spares Program or the Readiness Improvement Program must be
considered. The mix of spares will not necessarily be simply a multiple of peacetime
demand. We have to determine what level above peacetime consumption we need to
support.
Another area that needs work at the Fleet Commander in Chief level is
cost/benefit analysis. This thesis has looked at methods used for determining
requirements and pointed out that there needs to be a way to match capabilities to
requirements. If a Commander knows what shortfalls exist, other options or strategies
can be used. When operations plans are developed, the Commander in Chiefs staff
takes the forces allocated to the Commander in Chief and assigns them to the
geographic area necessary to counter the threat. The forces list, with destinations, is
turned over to the logisticians to compute "resupply". The "resupply" that is computed
is purely a guess at gross tonnage of items within each supply class/subclass that will
need to be transported within a given timeframe. What is not generated is how many
of which items are needed to support an operational unit for a specified timeframe
under wartime conditions.
Since we do not determine needs below the gross tonnage level we are not able to
do any comparative analysis. Using the current planning methodology, the Fleet
Commander in Chief does not have the capability to determine courses of action based
on the varying levels of support he is likely to receive. It would be beneficial for a
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Fleet Commander in Chief to be able to do comparative analysis of how long a
particular force could be sustained in combat under different levels of resupply or with
differing levels of particular items. The current planning system does not have this
capability because it can only provide the tons of a particular class of resupply due to
arrive at a given port in a specified timeframe. The method of employment will be
determined by the state of materiel readiness at the beginning of employment and by
the supportability of the forces. The capability for comparative analysis does not exist
on Fleet Commander in Chiefs' stalls. Very' little logistic capability analysis is being
done at higher echelons of command. To this end, it is important that each Fleet
Commander in Chief identify potential critical items and existing quantities of those
items. The Logistics Capabilities Estimator is a first attempt by the joint community
to do some analysis in this area. The benefits provided to the Navy will be
proportional to the amount of effort the Navy is willing to put into building the
necessary data files and as good as the data put into those files.
C. SUMMARY
This thesis has discussed the problems faced by the Fleet Commander in Chiefs',
the Fleet Type Commanders' and the Navy Supply Systems Command's staffs when
trying to determine critical items in accordance with the Joint Chief of Staff
requirement. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not provide a definition of the term
"critical item" each Navy staff must make its own definition and proceed from there.
The term "critical item" was defined in this thesis to be an item which contributes the
most to a platform's operational availability and is in short supply. Also presented are
some of the computer programs and models in use at the various levels of command to
determine shipboard requirements for spare parts. In summary, requirements are
determined by staff planners, based on historical data and observed trends. These
requirements are placed aboard ship in the form of the Consolidated Shipboard
Allowance List. If day to day operations prove the Consolidated Shipboard Allowance
List insufficient to meet demand, then those items which are unavailable are considered
critical items. Shipboard personnel can submit a request to have the Consolidated
Shipboard Allowance List changed or they can carry unauthorized stocks of spare
parts.
The models described in this thesis present different methods for determining the
stockage policies in a Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List. Until recently the
spares requirements for all parts were computed using the same methodology. This
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proved unsatisfactory because the stockage policy was not meeting its own objective,
so different computational methods were sought. There are now three basic procedures
in existance which give improved results if used in the right situation. The traditional
demand based method, represented in the Fleet Logistics Support Improvement
Program and the Modified Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program models
works best on simple, low complexity items. For highly reliable components of highly
complex systems, an availability improvement approach works the best. In order to
meet performance objectives, less reliable components of highly complex systems need
a combination of component redesign/design modification and a different mix and or
quantity of spares than is currently carried.
Determining what is critical is hard. Critical items are always changing and
depend on the current situation and on the future. The Commanding Officer of a ship
in the yards undergoing overhaul probably will not be too concerned if he must do
without one ol his main engines for two weeks because it is being replaced. But the
Commanding Officer of a ship in the Mediterranean Sea or the Persian Gulf could
become very anxious if he does not have spare fuses for the radar or spare circuit
boards for the fire control system. What is critical is relative. Trying to predict what
will be critical at some point in the future, not knowing if that point is ten days or ten
years away is almost impossible. Having confidence in that prediction is even more
difficult. The best we have been able to do so far is identify current problem areas and
give a best guess of how long it will take to solve them. We have also looked at
systems in the test or development phases and tried to predict future problems based
on past experience. Beyond that, everything is a "best guess".
In the requirements determination/identification area, one possible improvement
is in the area of communications between the Fleet Commander in Chief and his Type
Commanders. Each Fleet Commander in Chief is supported by Type Commanders for
air, surface and subsurface. These Type Commanders are responsible for the materiel
condition of all platforms under their purview. They track, and often intensively
manage, the items which cause the most problems and keep ships or aircraft from
being fully mission capable. Sometimes even items which only cause partial mission
degradation are included. Experience shows that, unfortunately, there is little
information exchanged between the Fleet Commander in Chiefs staff and his Type
Commanders' staffs during any planning phase, i.e. Joint Operational Plan
development, exercise development, wargame development, and Program Objectives
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Memorandum (POM) development. Communication generally occurs only when
something breaks, when a ship is down, awaiting parts. Possibly, if more
communication occurred during the planning for deployment, there would be less need
for communication during execution.
Two major problems encountered in planning are time available and personnel
trained to do planning. There is never enough time and there are seldom enough
people trained to use the planning systems efficiently or who even have a basic
knowledge of the purpose and functions of the planning system. Furthermore,
planning has traditionally had a low priority in the Navy so only major staffs have had
billets specifically for planning. Since the Fleet Commanders in Chief and the Fleet
Type Commanders both have planners on their staffs, half of the problem is taken care
of. What remains is for the staffs to coordinate their efforts and ensure time is
available for adequate communication between the staffs. In the rush to meet
deadlines, stall planners often neglect to ask their subordinates for information relative
to the problem being dealt with. The staff planner will make his "best guess" as to the
answer and forget that there is probably someone on a subordinate staff who has the
answer. The initiative will have to come from the senior command. The senior
command will need to provide the subordinate command with a description of the
situation and the information that the senior command needs to make its plans or
decisions. The subordinate commands will then be able to provide the senior
command the required information, using all information available to them. This
allows the lower level managers to manage the necessary details and the senior
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